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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
avoidance of the constitutional question as a purely dilatory strategem,
even though perhaps such action is dictated by compelling political con-
siderations, does little for the Court's prestige. Both lawer and lay-
man are dissatisfied.1 6 It would seem that decision of an issue fairly
presented is more consistent with the judicial function.
WILLIAM V. BURROW.
Constitutional Law-Judicial Enforcement of Racial
Restrictive Agreements*
In the Racial Restrictive Agreement Cases' the Supreme Court of
the United States decided that state and federal courts cannot enforce
by injunction agreements which exclude persons of a designated race or
color 2 from the ownership or occupancy of real property. Although the
" See, e.g., Editorial, N. Y. Times, June 26, 1948, p. 16, col. 2 ("Hard cases
make bad law"); President Philip Murray in The CIO News, June 28, 1948, p. 3,
col. 1 ("We regret that a majority of the Court did not deem it appropriate to
rule at this time on the constitutionality of the entire political expenditures clause
of the Act.").
* For other comments see Lathrop, The Racial Covenant Cases [1948] Wis. L.
REy. 508; Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-1948, 16 U. OF CHI. L.
REv. 1, 22 (1948); 46 MICH. L. REv. 978 (1948); U. S. News & World Report,
May 14, 1948, pp. 22-23, 50; Time, May 17, 1948, p. 25, col. 3; Popular Govern-
ment, June, 1948, p. 4 (Institute of Government, Chapel Hill, N. C.). On the
general subject see PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY (summary of the brief for the United
States as Ainicus Curiae, Shelley v. Kraemer, Hurd v. Hodge, 68 Sup. Ct. 836,
847 (1948) ; LONG AND JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPERTY (1947).
1 Shelley v. Kraemer, 68 Sup. Ct. 836 (1948), reversing 355 Mo. 814, 198
S. W. 2d 679 (1946) (recorded agreement restricting property to use and occu-
pancy for fifty years to Caucasians only; specifically excluding Negroes or Mon-
golians) ; McGhee v. Sipes, 68 Sup. Ct. 836 (1948), reversing 316 Mich. 614, 25
N. W. 2d 638 (1947) (agreement that property . . . shall not be used or occupied
by any person . . . except of the Caucasian race ... ;" to remain in effect until
Jan. 1, 1960; 80% of designated property owners must sign); Hurd v. Hodge,
Uricolo v. Same, 68 Sup. Ct. 847 (1948), reversing 162 F. 2d 233 (App. D. C.
1947) (covenant ". . . that said lot shall never be rented, leased, sold, transferred
or conveyed unto any Negro or colored person, under penalty $2,000 . . . lien
against the land. . . ." No time limit). Unanimous opinions written by Chief
Justice Vinson. See Arthur Krock, The, Chief Justice Closes a Loophole, N. Y.
Times, May 4, 1948, p. 24, col. 5 ("In these two rulings Chief Justice Vinson
revealed his legal and political trend of mind."). Six justices participated; Reed,
Jackson and Rutledge took no part. "The assumption around the Court was
that one or more of them might have owned or were interested in property
restricted by covenants." N. Y. Times, May 4, 1948, p. 1, col. 6. The decision
in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, governed three orders handed down by the Court
one week later, Trustees of Monroe Ave. Church of Christ v. Perkins, 68 Sup. Ct.
1069 (1) (1948), reversing 147 Ohio St. 537, 72 N. E. 2d 97 (1947); Amer v.
Superior Court of Calif. in and for County of Los Angeles, 68 Sup. Ct. 1069 (2)
(1948); Yin Kim v. Same, 68 Sup. Ct. 1069 (3) (1948) (remanded to Calif.
court to consider its decision in light of Shelley v. Kraemer, supra.).
2 The Justice Department has said the rulings also apply to agreements directed
toward religious groups, News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), May 5, 1948,
p. 7, col. 3. No cases have been found with restrictions against Catholics, Prot-
estants, Democrats, or Republicans; although one case suggested the dangers of
residential segregation and mentioned these groups, State v. Darnell, 166 N. C.
300, 302, 81 S. E. 338, 339 (1914) (validity of a municipal zoning ordinance).
The four cases before the Supreme Court involved Negroes. Court noted that
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agreements themselves are valid, enforcement by the state court denies
the excluded person the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.3 Enforcement by the fed-
restrictive agreements "... have been used to exclude other than Negroes from
the ownership or occupancy of real property. We are informed that such agree-
ments have been directed against Indians, Jews, Chinese Japanese, Mexicans,
Hawaiians, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos, among others." Shelley v. Kraemer,
supra note 1, at 846 n. 26. Among others: Yin Kim v. Superior Court of State
of Calif. in and for County of Los Angeles, 68 Sup. Ct. 1069 (3) (1948) (Chinese
and Koreans); Essex Real Estate Co. v. Holmes, 37 0. W. N. 69 (1930) (Euro-
peans, except those of English-speaking countries and the French and people of
French descent) ; McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State Court En-
forcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants or Conditions in Deeds Is Uncon-
stitutional, 33 CALIF. L. REv. 5, 15 (1945) (Hindus, Armenians, or natives of
the Turkish Empire, or descendants of such named persons, etc.). Some agree-
ments except domestic servants. E.g., Pepper v. West End Development Co., 211
N. C. 166, 167, 189 S. E. 628, 629 (1936) ; MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE
NEGRO, 150 (1940); McGovney, supra.
'State Action: There is nothing new in holding that judgment of the state
court is an act of the state. E.g., cases collected in Shelley v. Kraemer, 68 Sup.
Ct. 836, 843 n. 14 (1948). This is the first time the doctrine has been applied to
enforcement of racial restrictive agreements, although such agreements have been
attacked as invalid because they are alleged to be unlawful discrimination within
prohibitions of the Federal Constitution. The courts have uniformly rejected the
contention. Note, 162 A. L. R. 180, 184 (1946) (cases collected). The Supreme
Court here calls the agreements valid, Shelley v. Kraemer, supra at 842. The
only decision contrary is Gandofolo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C. C. Calif. 1892).
Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323 (1926) has been consistently cited to support
both the validity and the enforceability of racial restrictive agreements. Cases
collected in MANGUS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 147; ROTTSCHAEFER, CoNsTITU-
TIONAL LAW 526 (1939); Note, The Negro Citizen in the Supreme Court, 52
HARv. L. REv. 823, 831 (1939). But the standing of Corrigan, v. Buckley had
been challenged, arguing that although it declared the agreements valid it decided
nothing as to their enforceability in federal courts (the case arose in the District
of Columbia), and most certainly nothing as to enforceability in state courts. See
McGovney, supra note 2, at 15-25; Kahen, Validity of Anti-Negro Restrictive
Covenants: A Reconsideration of the Problem, 12 U. oF CHi. L. Rxv. 198, 202
(1945) ; Taylor, The Racial Restrictive Covenant in the Light of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, 14 Bnoox yN L. Rxv. 80, 88 (1947). But see 45 MicH. L. REv.
733, 740 (1947). The racial restrictive agreements cases settle that issue in favor
of Messrs. McGovney, Kahen, and Taylor, making a technically correct but un-
realistic distinction of Corrigan v. Buckley. Frank, The United States Supreme
Court: 1947-1948, 16 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 1, 23 (1948). See 46 MIcH. L. REv.
978 (1948) (arguing that the principal cases open up new fields of litigation);
accord, Editorial, A Blow to Southern Customs, Charlotte (N. C.) News, May
5, 1948, p. 4-A, col. 1; Frank, supra at 23 ("Assume that the doctrine of the...
cases is that a state court may not by its decree achieve a discriminatory result
which a state could not order by direct legislative action. It would then follow
that whatever would be a violation of constitutional rights if done by statute is
also a violation of constitutional rights if done by decree . . . it can rationally
follow that the entire realm of common law interpretation by a state will be
subject to federal judicial review. It is doubtful that the Court meant to go
so far. .. ").
Equal Protection: Enforcement by state courts is a denial of the equal pro-
tection of the laws because ". . . freedom from discrimination by the States in
the enjoyment of property rights was among the basic objectives sought to be
effectuated by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment. That such discrimina-
tion has occurred in these cases is clear. Because of the race or color of these
petitioners they have been denied rights of ownership and occupancy enjoyed as a
matter of course by other citizens of a different race or color." Shelley v.
Kraemer, supra, at 845. On the question why racial segregation laws applicable
to public education and public accommodations are constitutional, when racial
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eral court is a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 18664 and is contrary
to the public policy of the United States.'
Residential segregation based on race or color has developed with
the extensive migration of Negroes from the southern to the northern
and western regions of the nation; 6 and with the pronounced shift
segregation is not permitted in residential areas by judicial enforcement of racial
restrictive agreements or by state and municipal legislation [Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U. S. 60 (1917)] see McGovney, supra note 2, at 25-29; Taylor, supra, at
93; 46 MicH. L. REv. 639 (1948); PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY 45, 94 n. 26 (summary
of brief for the United States as Ainicus Curiae, Shelley v. Kraemer, Hurd v.
Hodge, 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 847 (1948). In searching for an answer it was said,
"The relevant point is that part [of the 14th Amendment] which says 'No State
shall make or enforce any law. . . .' If the Court hews to the line of the 14th
Amendment, it will inevitably follow that there can no longer be any State laws
or enforcement of laws against Negroes' . . . participating in the community
life on the basis of full social equality. Which is to say, in fact and in short, to
subject the long standing customs of the South and the relations of both races
in the South to a distortion which would crack both wide open. . . . We are
very much afraid that the Court's decision confronts the people of the South,
both white and colored, with the most critical questions." Editorial, A Blow to
Southernt Customs, supra. The decisions have been acclaimed as a "blow to
segregation" by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People,
News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), May 4, 1948, p. 13, col. 3; and by other
groups, N. Y. Times, May 4, 1948, p. 2, col. 3. This effect was recognized by
Noel Yancey, N. C. Segregation Laws Under Attack, Charlotte (N. C.) News,
May 5, 1948, p. 12-A, col. 1 ("... another segregation practice lost its props this
week.").
14 STAT. 27 (1866), 8 U. S. C. §42 (1940), "All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property."
'Enforcement of the agreements by a federal court would be contrary to the
public policy of the United States because "We cannot presume that the public
policy of the United States manifests a lesser concern for the protection of such
basic rights against discriminatory action of federal courts than against such
action taken by the courts of the States." Hurd v. Hodge, 68 Sup. Ct. 847, at
853 (1948). No court in the United States, with the possible exception of a
Federal Circuit Court in California in the Gandolfo case, supra note 3, has held
that racial restrictive agreements are void because contrary to the public policy of
the United States. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to consider the
argument. See Cornish v. O'Donoghue, 30 F. 2d 983 (App. D. C. 1929), cer.
denied, 279 U. S. 871 (1929). The same argument was presented in the Racial
Restrictive Agreement Cases, in the brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae.
PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 68-74. Compare Re Drummond
Wren [1945] 4 D. L. R. 674 (Ont. H. C.), 59 HAiv. L. Rav. 803 (1946) (using
a worldwide concept of public policy to overcome local prejudices) with Re Noble
and Wolfe [1948] 0. R. 579 (restrictive agreement against Jews and Negroes,
etc., not void as being contrary to public policy. ". . . Courts must not 'roam
unchecked in the field occupied by that unruly horse, public policy."').
'In 1940 74.4% of all non-whites lived in the Southern States. By 1947 this
had been reduced to 63.5%. In 1940 about 10 million Negroes lived in the
South; in 1947 about 9y2 million lived there-a loss of 500,000 in seven years.
CuRRENT POPULATION REPoRTs, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, No. 9, Jan.
19, 1948. During the same period the Negro population in the San Francisco
Bay Area increased 227%, with an estimated 64,000 Negroes living there in 1947.
THE NEGao HANDBOOx 27 (1946-1947). During the years 1935-1940 North Caro-
lina suffered a net migration loss of 5,000 whites and 10,000 non-whites. Color
and Sex of Migrants, Internal Migration 1935-1940, Special Reports, Bureau of
the Census, Table 9, p. 19, Sixteenth Census of the United States: 1940. From
1940 to 1947 net migration loss of North Carolina was 400,000. Current Popula-
tion Reports, Bureau of the Census, Series P-25, No. 2, Table 2, p. 6, Aug. 9,
1948.
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among Negroes from the rural to the urban areas in the South.7 Fear
of economic loss8 and racial prejudice9 caused the inhabitants of white
neighborhoods to seek lawful means to prevent the invasion of their
residential areas by Negroes.
Racial segregation ordinances were adopted in a number of cities,
largely in the South;1° but were declared unconstitutional by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in 1917.11 Thus, the racial restrictive
Migration of non-whites within the South is not as extensive as non-white
migration outside the area. Rapid urbanization of the Negro in the South is
deterred by (1) lack of economic opportunity in industrial jobs, coupled with
housing shortages, and (2) increasing opportunities in agriculture caused by the
large white urbanization. CURRENT PoPuLAiox REPORTS, Bureau of the Census,
Series P-20, No. 14, April 15, 1948; FARMS or NoN-WHiTE FARM OPERATORS,
etc., Bureau of the Census, Series NA No. 14, March 4, 1948. North Carolina's
non-white farmers increased from 60,000 in 1940 to 74,000 in 1945; the value of
buildings and land increased 67% during same period, or from $113,000,000 to
$189,000,000. Ibid. Even in rural areas ". . . there is residential segregation, but
it does not affect the housing conditions of Negroes as much as their prospects as
farmers .... In general only 'acceptable' Negroes are allowed to buy land, and
there is great reluctance toward selling the more desirable property to any Negro."
STma, THE NEaR's SHARE 200 n. 11 (1943).
Invasion of white neighborhoods by Negroes is alleged to cause immediate
depreciation in property yalues. Investigation of this allegation establishes the
view that if the depreciation is immediate as it respects the white owners, it is
also temporary. Kahen, supra note 3, at 202 n. 20. "Sacrifice sales" by the white
owner may work for the benefit of the Negro, STERNR , op. cit. supra note 7, at
209; or may have the opposite result, MANGUM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 139;
U. S. News & World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 23, col. 3. Nevertheless, "Rightly
or wrongly, the Negro has always been regarded as a menace to real estate val-
ues," STERNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 314; 2 SImEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §459
(p. 301) (1936). See Brief for Appellants, p. 11, Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds
Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. 2d 710 (1945) ("A large area of valuable
real property in Winston-Salem is under the blight of a covenant that restricts
against its ownership or occupancy by negroes. Because the area is surrounded
by ex.tensive areas exclusively occupied by negroes, every part of the restricted
area is valueless except for itse and occupancy by negroes." [Emphasis supplied.]
" MANGUM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 138 (aversion of white people toward living
in close proximity to Negroes) ; 2 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 460 (1936) (there
is a strong desire to prevent the inroads of members of certain races in particular
residential areas); STERNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 201 n. 12, concerning poll
taken by Fortune Magazine where from 77% to 87% of the informants in various
sections of the country were in favor of residential segregation of Negroes, based
either on legal provisions or on social pressure--only 10o to 19% were against
racial residential segregation; Kahen, supra note 3, at 202; 46 MIcH. L. REv. 654,
661 (1948) (". . . the courts seem to feel that the element of prejudice predomi-
nates.") ; STERNER, id. at 202 (It should be noted ". . . that housing segregation.
unlike certain other segregative practices, is as prevalent in northern communities
having a heavy Negro population as in the South. Northern communities which
boast of the fact that they have no legal segregation actually may have at least
partial segregation in regard to schools, hospitals, and other similar institutions
as a consequence of their housing segregation."). The current housing shortage
has made the problem acute, Taylor, supra note 3, at 83.
"0 The evolution of the racial restrictive zoning legislation is traced in: JoHIt-
SON, PATrmums OF NEGRO SEGREGATION 173-176 (1943); STERNER, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 206-209; probably the most thorough discussion can be found in MAN-
GUM, op. cit. supra note 2, at 138-147.
"Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) commented on in 3 CORN. L. Q.
280; 18 COL. L. REv. 147; 31 HARv. L. Rxv. 475; 27 YALE L. J. 393 (1918). The
decision did not keep Winston-Salem, N. C., from adopting residential segregation
plans as part of a general zoning ordinance in 1930. The North Carolina Supreme
1949]
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agreement 12 which had been developing' 3 as a subsidiary legal device
was selected as best suited for carrying out racial residential segregation.
The state and federal courts generally held such agreements valid
and enforceable. 14 In some jurisdictions a distinction was made be-
tween restrictions against the conveyance of the legal title to and re-
strictions against the use or occupancy by a member of the excluded
class.15 Constitutional questions were usually dismissed with a state-
Court declared it unconstitutional in Clinard v. Winston-Salem, 217 N. C. 119,
6 S. E. 2d 867 (1940). This was Winston's second attempt. In 1912 the Board
of Aldermen of Winston, N. C. (now Winston-Salem), adopted a racial segrega-
tion ordinance. The North Carolina Supreme Court declared it void because the
general public policy of the state was to discourage emigration of Negro labor,
and the ordinance would have the opposite result. State v. Darnell, 166 N. C.
300, 81 S. E. 338 (1914).
'" In form the agreements restrict the conveyance of the legal title to a mem-
ber of the excluded group, or the use of or occupancy by such a person, or both
ownership and occupancy. The restriction is found in deeds or written agree-
ments. It may be cast as a covenant or a condition subsequent, or a combination
of the two. Some agreements are limited in time, others are not. For classes of
person excluded see note 2 .sipra. The principal cases are illustrative of the various
types of agreements, see note 1 supra; Note, 162 A. L. R. 180 (1946) (cases col-
lected on various types and the distinctions indulged in by the courts) ; PaEJUDICE
AND PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 11.
"E.g., illustrative uses of the restrictive agreements prior to Buchanan v.
Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917): Hurd v. Hodge, 68 Sup. Ct. 847 (1948) (deed
executed in 1906 in the District of Columbia); in St. Louis, Mo., home of
petitioner in Shelley v. Kraemer, 68 Sup. Ct. 836 (1948), the use of the agree-
ments began about 1910, LONG AND JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPERTY 12 (1947).
The agreement in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra, at 838 was signed Feb. 16, 1911;
Koehler v. Rowland, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S. W. 217 (1918) (deed executed in 1905) ;
widespread use of the racial restrictive agreement did not develop until the 1920's,
LONG AND JOHNsON, op. cit. mupra, at 13. Taylor, supra note 3, at 83 ("Today
[1947] the restrictive covenant has flourished like the greenbay tree in a soil madefertile by fear of economic loss, irrational race hatred and the current housing
shortage.").
" E.g., cases collected in Notes, 162 A. L. R. 180 (1946) supplementing 114
A. L. R. 1237 (138), 66 A. L. R. 531 (1930) and 9 A. L. R. 120 (1920); Mc-
Govney, supra note 2, at 5; Kahen, supra note 3, at 198; Taylor, supra note 3,
at 80; PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 3; Brief of the American
Jewish Congress as Ainicus Curiae, Shelley v. Kraemer, Hurd v. Hodge, 68 Sup.
Ct. 836, 847 (1948).
"Holding a restriction against sale or lease illegal: Foster v. Stewart, 134
Cal. App. 482, 25 P. 2d 497 (1933) ; Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 266 N. W.
532 (1925) ; White v. White, 108 W. Va. 128, 150 S. E. 531 (1929) ; Williams
v. Commercial Land Co., 34 Ohio L. Rep. 559 (1929). But California, Michigan
and West Virginia hold that a restriction against use or occupancy is a legal re-
straint: Stone v. Jones, 66 Cal. App. 2d 264, 152 P. 2d 19 (1944); Shulte v.
Starks, 238 Mich. 102, 213 N. W. 102 (1927); White v. White, supra (dictum).
Such a distinction has been criticized by McGovney, supra note 2, at 8 n. 17,
where he contends that covenants against ownership or occupancy are technical
restraints on alienation, and that the courts must determine that the restraint
is so substantial as to be an illegal restraint. He criticizes Professors Tiffany
and Simes for accepting the fallacious assumption that technically the covenant
is not a restraint on alienation, see 5 TnFrANY, REAL PROPERTY §1345 (3d ed.
1939) ; 2 SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §460 (1936). North Carolina does not make
such a distinction. Phillips v. Wearn, 226 N. C. 290, 295, 37 S. E. 2d 895, 897(1946) ("Therefore, not by virtue of a general plan or scheme, but by the agree-
ment, the parties hereto have created a restrictive covenant [against ownership
or occupancy by Negroes] which is valid and enforceable between the parties.") ;
other North Carolina cases on racial restrictive agreements: Vernon v. R. J.
[Vol. 27
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ment that the prohibitions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
refer only to federal and state action and not to agreements of private
individuals."" And so they do, but it is the court enforcement of the
private agreements that is now banned as government action.
The creators of the unconstitutional racial zoning ordinances17 and
the unenforceable racial restrictive agreements are today searching
for new plans that will keep certain neighborhoods "exclusive and
restricted."'' 8
The Supreme Court's "valid but not enforceable" doctrine 9 does
not settle the questions of court enforcement of cash deposits or bonds
given to secure the performance of agreements not to transfer the re-
stricted property to one of the excluded persons.2 0  It is certain that
Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. 2d 710, (1946) ; Eason v. Buffaloe,
198 N. C. 520, 152 S. E. 496 (1930). That such agreements are, however, com-
mon in North Carolina is public knowledge. News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.),
May 4, 1948, p. 1, col. 6. Such agreements are frequently found in the North
Carolina reports in cases on covenants in general.
"0 The courts missed the point that it is not the validity of the agreement but
the enforcement by state or federal court that is questioned. See note 3 supra.: See notes 10 and 11, supra.
18 U. S. News and World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 22, col. 1 et seq. It is
interesting to read what real estate men in Greensboro, N. C., had to say about
the decisions in the principal cases: "Little Effect Expected Here-Real Estate
Agents Comment on Ruling. Most of the real estate dealers said present prac-
tices and customs in regard to white and Negro property sales will continue....
'For two or three years now we have been seeing a section in South Greensboro
gradually purchased by Negroes. It was inevitable because the section was ad-jacent to Negro residential areas,' a spokesman for the realtors said. . ....
Evidently questioned as to whether or not there would be a mass movement of
Negroes into white areas anytimd soon, one answered, "It's a long way from us"
Another replied, "We're not likely to be bothered by requests from Negroes to
buy property in sections like, say, Irving Park or Starmont. In the first place
property owners hardly would sell to Negroes, and in the second place, the
Negroes couldn't afford to buy such property." [Italics added.] Asked, perhaps,
if he expected "trouble," one agent stated, "About the only trouble we could
expect is not from present residents but from some out-of-town person who would
try to make a 'test' case of the matter." Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News, May
4, 1948, p. 1, col. 4 and p. 3, col. 1.
10 While "valid but unenforceable" agreements are known in other fields of
the law, e.g., in cases affected by Statutes of Fraud and Statutes of Limitations,
they are believed to be distinguishable from the principal cases because of the
objectives of their unenforceability and the lack of conflict between the agreements
and social policy.
0 "Racial restrictive agreements still can be written into deeds, and signers
can be required to deposit cash or give bond, as a guarantee that they will abide
by its terms. . . . Thus, if the restrictive covenant is violated by one of the
signers, he may be penalized through forfeiture of the cash he deposited when
he signed the covenant. Whether the courts will uphold such a forfeiture, how-
ever, still is considered an open question. One other weakness of this plan, from
a practical standpoint, is that many householders do not have money to deposit
for such a purpose. Even where deposits are made, some signer may find it
profitable to forfeit the cash he has put up, in order to take advantage of an
exceptional offer from a member of a racial group barred under the covenant's
terms." U. S. News & World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 22, col. 2. In Hurd v.
Hodge, 68 Sup. Ct. 847 (1948) the covenant provided for forfeiture of $2,000
penalty on breach. The Supreme Court did not consider allowing recovery of
the penalty. The case was reversed and not remanded. See 46 MicH. L. REv.
978, 979 (1948).
1949]
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courts will not be permitted to enjoin a breach of the racial restrictive
agreement or to cancel a conveyance to a member of the excluded class,
2
'
but is it possible to award damages for the breach of such an
agreement ?22
Perhaps some state courts, in attempts indirectly to enforce racial
restrictive agreements, will hold that a determinable fee, where the spe-
cial limitation provides for the exclusion of unwanted groups, can be
distinguished from the type of agreements in the principal cases.
28
21 "Enforcement of the restriction is usually by a neighboring landowner who
is a party to such a recorded agreement, or who may assert an interest in the
restriction under the rules normally governing covenants running with the land.
Almost invariably the relief requested is the removal of the excluded occupant, or
injunction against his entry, and, where sales restrictions have been violated, can-
cellation of the offending deeds." PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 12. Enforcement has been refused on equitable grounds when infiltration of the
Negroes causes the landowners to seek equitable relief from a "white elephant."
McGovney, mspra note 2, at 12-14; Note, 162 A. L. R. 180, 187 (1946). In Vernon
v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E. 2d 710 (1946) an action
was brought for equitable relief against the "burden" of restrictive covenants in
deeds to property in "Skyland," a residential section in Winston-Salem, N. C.
Within recent years the whole surrounding area for a depth of a quarter-mile had
been acquired by Negroes. The defendants' (white owners who wanted to keep
the covenants) demurrer was sustained below; held affirmed, the changed conditions
outside the development afford no grounds for relief.
22 The recovery of damages has not usually been the relief sought. See note
21 supra. But in Eason v. Buffaloe, 198 N. C. 520, 152 S. E. 496 (1930) the
defendant, owner of a tract of land which he proposed to subdivide into resi-
dential lots, sold some of the lots to the plaintiff and contracted with him that all
remaining lots, when sold, would be conveyed by deeds containing restrictions
against the sale to or occupancy by any Negro. The plaintiff was held entitled
to maintain an action for damages ($2,000 alleged) upon the defendant's sub-
sequently conveying some of the lots to the State School for the Blind and Deaf
by deeds not containing either of the promised restrictions. The School had
announced its purpose to erect and maintain on the lots a school for Negroes.
Now that the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that such agree-
ments are not enforceable by injunction, it seems probable that when presented
with the question of damages for breach the Court will follow through. An
option to purchase which does not conform to the time requirements of the Rule
against Perpetuities cannot be enforced under the doctrine of specific perform-
ance. Damages for breach of the option contract are allowed, however, in Eng-
land-not so in America, and rightly so, Note, 162 A. L. R. 581, 591 (1946);
S mEs, op. cit. supra note 9, §512. If the grantee is free to convey the property
to whomever he pleases, but is subject to a suit for damages, or the threat of
such a suit with the possibility of judgment rendered against him, then he is
deterred from conveying because of the fear and/or the expense and trouble of
defending such an action. In effect the threat of a suit for damages would lend
the "full panoply of state power" to the practical effectiveness of the racial
agreement. The Supreme Court should not allow an action in law for damages
to accomplish for all practical purposes what it has ruled an action in equity for
injunctive relief cannot accomplish.
23 Technically such a distinction exists. In a fee on condition subsequent
[one type of agreement found in deeds, see Shelley v. Kraemer, 68 Sup. Ct. 836(1948) where a condition "attach(ing) to the land" was used] ". . . the words
which provide for the termination of the estate on a contingency are not re-
garded as a part of the original limitation of the estate, but are considered to
provide for the cutting off of the estate before its proper termination, in the case
of an estate on special limitation [determinable fee] the words of the contingency
are regarded as a part of the limitation itself, and so as not cutting off an estate
previously limited, but as merely naming an alternative limit to the duration of
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However, when a court is called upon to answer these questions it
should declare that determinable fees with such a limitation, forfeiture
of the land or the security, or the awarding of damages for breach of
agreement are equally banned as state action.2 4
The effectiveness of other devices is dependent more on the private
manipulations of the law of real property than on questions of con-
stitutionality. Membership plans, either in corporations or clubs, are
already in use.25 Requiring membership in such an organization as a
condition precedent to the individual ownership of real property, where
membership in the club or corporation is dependent upon the consent
of other stockholders or members, is not a valid condition. It is prob-
ably an unlawful restraint on the transfer of property and void.2 6
Neighborhood approval agreements, where a majority of the five
nearest neighbors must approve the new occupant before the residence
can be sold or rented are in the same category as membership plans.
They are probably void.27
the estate." 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §217 (p. 380) 3d ed. 1939). In the fee
on condition subsequent the grantor retains a right of entry for condition broken;
in the determinable fee he has a possibility of reverter. For other distinctions as
to alienability of these rights, etc., see McCall, Estates on Condition and on Spe-
cial Limitation in North Carolina, 19 N. C. L. REv. 334 (1941). This distinction
would necessarily be made in any of the American jurisdictions [about 20] recog-
nizing the fee determinable. See 1 SIMEs, FuTuRE INTERESTS §178 n. 10 (1936) ;
1 TwFANY, REAL PROPERTY §220 n. 85 (3d ed. 1939) and cases collected therein.
Practically, of course, there is no appreciable difference. See Goldstein, Rights
of Entry and Possibilities of Reverter as Devices to Restrict the Use of Land,
54 HAR . L. REv. 248 (1940).
-' See notes 20, 22 and 23 supra. The Court was explicit in its contempt for
racial restrictive agreements. It is hardly possible that a firm stand against en-
forcement by injunction will be distinguished from enforcement by danage suits,
etc. To hold otherwise would be ". . . to make a mockery of the rest of his
[Vinson's] decision." Lathrop, The Racial Covenant Cases, [1948] Wis. L. REV.
508, at 526, 527.
" While the legality of such plans is open to question (see note 26 infra) it
is reported that "Meanwhile, many real estate subdivisions probably will be
platted and sold in connection with golf clubs, tennis clubs, gardening clubs, and
a great variety of other clubs based on some common activity or interest." U. S.
News & World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 22, col. 3.
"' "In the United States, except in Kentucky . . . a condition or limitation in
a conveyance or devise in fee to the effect that the grantee or the devisee is not
to alienate except with the consent of some other person is void." SIMES, op. cit.
supra note 9, §461; TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 15, §1345. Accord as to direc-
tions not to alienate without consent of another: Schwren v. Falls, 170 N. C. 251,
87 S. E. 49 (1916). (consent of executor required before wife could dispose of
property left to her by will of husband). If a real estate corporation, in develop-
ing a new subdivision, conveyed property to buyers with a provision that a
neighborhood improvement association would be formed, and that said association
would have the power to appoint subsequent purchasers of that property, it has
been noted that this is no direct restraint on alienation. It is a purely collateral
power. The original buyer can dispose of the property, as can the association,
but the original buyer's alienation is subject to the association's appointment. See
SIMES, op. cit. supra, §461. Of course, the original buyer would probably con-
sider the power of appointment in the association as a dangerous possibility; but
he may waive that danger because (1) he would be a member of the association
and (2) neighborhood uniformity would be achieved.
" The element of consent of another is the determinative point. See note 26
supra.
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Plans whereby a corporation owns title to property and leases it to
occupants, or where a "first-refusal" option plan is included in a neigh-
borhood real estate "improvement" association are distinguishable from
the membership-approval plans and should be valid 28 if they meet
certain requirements specified hereinafter.
Repurchase options, or "first-refusal" options, in favor of the grantor
of real property, where the time for the exercise of the option is lim-
ited so as to conform to the requirements of the Rule against Per-
petuities29 are probably valid and enforceable.3 0 A price should be set
for the repurchase and included in the option ;31 but where the price is
so ridiculously low that to enforce the option would amount to an abso-
lute restraint on alienation, the courts should favor the grantee and
declare the provision void.3 2
The long term lease33 with conditions against assignment, subleasing
"When title remains in the corporation and property is leased to the occupant
the lessor's purpose is to protect his land and the law approves of that. SImEs,
op. cit. sutra, note 9, §466. Such a transaction is subject to the laws on landlord
and tenant. But when a fee simple estate, as distinguished from the above estate
for years, is given with a restraint against alienation except with the consent of
another, the grantor has no legally protected interest. In the lease plan the lessor
does have a legally protected interest.
When the grantor of a fee simple has the option to repurchase the property
from the grantee before he can sell to anyone else, the existence of the option
is not an unlawful restraint on alienation. It does not prevent the grantee from
selling, but rather aids the grantor in buying the property back. Sinms, op. cit.
supra, note 9, §462 (1936). This repurchase option plan could be successfully
employed where the holder of the option was a neighborhood real estate asso-
ciation. One of the difficulties with the option plan is that generally the grantee
desires to sell at a time that is not propitious for the grantor. The association
would spread that burden. See LONG AND JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 13, at
39-55 (1947) for the various types of "neighborhood improvement associations."
"Future interests must vest, if at all, within a life or lives in being plus
twenty-one year and ten lunar months, American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 228
N. C. 458, 46 S. E. 2d 104 (1948) ; 27 N. C. L. REv. 158 (1948) ; SIMEs, Op. Cit.
supra, note 9, §§477-552.
" Note, 162 A. L. R. 581, 594 (1946). The practicality of options is questioned
in 46 MIcH. L. REV. 978, 979 (1948) (too expensive and a severe restraint on
title). The American Law Institute takes the position 'that such options are
subject to the Rule against Perpetuities. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §394 (1936).
Cf. Hardy v. Galloway, 111 N. C. 519, 15 S. E. 890 (1892) (option to re-purchase
"when sold" declared void).
" In Hardy v. Galloway, ibid., the deed contained a provision whereby the
grantors retained for themselves and their heirs and assigns, the right to repur-
chase the land "when sold2W' Court held that the provision was void because (1)
it fixed no price for the repurchase; (2) for uncertainty; (3) no time fixed for
the performance of the provision; (4) it was an unlawful restraint on alienation.
It appears that if the defects in (1), (2), and (3) were corrected the right to re-
purchase may have been sustained. Hardy v. Galloway, id. at 525, 15 S. E. at
890 (1892).
"Re Rosher [1884] L. R. 26 Ch. Div. (Eng.) 801 (price set in will was
£3,000-actual value at exercise of option was £15,000). This could be avoided
by placing a provision for "fair market value" at time of the exercise of the
option, rather than a stipulated price.
" E.g., Henderson v. Virden Coal Co., 78 Ill. App. 437 (1897) (lease for 999
years); Todhunter v. Des Moines, I. & M. R. Co., 58 Iowa 205, 12 N. W. 267(1882) (lease for 999 years); Banks v. Haskie, 45 Md. 207 (1876) (lease for
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or alienation3 4 by the tenant and with a covenant for perpetual renewal35
is probably the most practicable legal device available for maintaining
restricted neighborhoods, although in the past it has been used primarily
for commercial purposes.3 6 But even here the would-be purchaser must
balance the desirability of owning the property in fee simple absolute
against that of retaining the desired uniformity.3 7
Restrictions against objectionable uses of land have been sustained.38
ninety-nine years renewable forever). The longer the time the lease is to run the
greater the restraint, and the reversioner's interest to be protected would be of
less value; yet the courts have made no distinction as to the length of the term.
2 SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS §466 (1936); GRAY, RULE AGAINST ALIENATION
§§101-103 (2d ed. 1895).
112 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §466 (1936). ("If land is leased for a term of
years, it is everywhere recognized that the landlord may insert a condition in the
lease to the effect that, on the tenant's alienation or on his alienation without
consent, his lease may be forfeited.")
" On covenants for perpetual renewal see 2 SimEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §511
(1936) (cases collected in note 75 at 375) ; Note, 3 A. L. R. 498 (1919) supple-
mented in 162 A. L. R. 1147 (1946) ; Thaw v. Gaffney, 75 W. Va. 229, 83 S. E.
983 (1914); 2 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §§406, 410 (3d ed. 1939). On renewal
provisions in leases and related subjects see Notes, 14 A. L. R. 948 (1921) (gen-
eral provisions for renewal); 26 A. L. R. 1413 (1923) (what amounts to an
option to renew); 39 A. L. R. 279 (1925) (when covenants to renew should be
construed to be for perpetual renewal, an excellent annotation). Sometimes a
notice provision is placed in the lease. Notes, 99 A. L. R. 1010 (1935), 1 A. L. R.
343 (1919).
Land is frequently leased for the production of oil and gas, e.g., cases col-
lected in Note, 3 A. L. R. 378 (1919). The long term lease has been used ex-
tensively in residential development in Maryland as a part of the ground rent
system. ROBERT KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW §389 (1946) ("The chief char-
acteristics of the Maryland ground rent leases are: (1) the landowner leases the
land to the lessee for a period of ninety-nine years; (2) with a provision for
perpetual renewal of the lease from time to time as each ninety-nine year period
draws to a close, upon payment of a small sum of money called a renewal fine;
(3) the lessee agrees to pay a certain sum of money ... as ground rent; (4) and
the lease contains a provision that if the lessee make default in his ground rent
payments, the lessor may declare the lease void and evict the lessee. The lessee
also agrees to pay the taxes ... and they are assessed to (him).... In practical
economic effect, the relation of the lessee to the property is that of the owner
of the land, subject to the payment of annual rent and taxes. . . . The technical
relation between the owner of the rent and leaseholder is that of landlord and
tenant. Jones v. Magruder, 42 F. Supp. 193 [1941]").
17 By ".... taking a long term lease the tenant secures the sole use and possible
increase in value of the land for a long term of years, and, in some cases, forever,
without putting up any cash consideration, except perhaps, a security deposit. He
is thus enabled to place all his money in improvements or in his business ...
The lease throws upon the lessee practically all the burdens incident to ownership
of the land, such as payment of taxes, and assumption of loss due to decline in
land value, but confers on the lessee essentially all the benefits of ownership.
[Emphasis supplied.] . . . A lessee does not acquire the legal title. His interest
is . . . personal property. His wife . . . does not have dower in the leased
premises." ROBERT KRATOVIL, REAL ESTATE LAW §388 (1946).
""A restriction against the use of residential property as a residence differs
from a restriction against other uses such as that no intoxicants shall be sold on
the property. While the latter is a restraint on alienation it does not diminish
the vendability of the property sufficiently to be held an illegal restraint." Mc-
Govney, supra note 2, at 9 n. 17. However, a restriction against the sale of
liquor made by the common grantor of lots, and providing for forfeiture to the
grantor in case of any such sale, affects the property, unless removed or released,
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It has been suggested that in keeping with these attempts to secure
"high occupancy" standards a restriction against use or occupancy ex-
cept by a college graduate 9 might be given a try. Without arguing
what practical benefit such a restriction would have on racial segrega-
tion, if any, it is most likely an unlawful restraint on alienation and
void.40
All of these plans are subject to practical difficulties. Repurchase
options and long term leases attached to real property tend to restrict
severely the alienability of the land. The title is rendered less market-
able.4 ' As a result, problems related to the financing and mortgage-
ability of the property increase. Questions of the effect on inheritance,
wills, and trusts will deter many. On the other hand, such devices
will have a retarding effect on the possible danger to vested real estate
values created by the decisions in the principal cases. The plans can
be used readily in new residential "subdivisions." Their worth in more
fully developed residential areas is questionable.
42
The Supreme Court has narrowed the possible legal plans for re-
stricting the use of land to certain classes of persons. Even those sug-
gested here, the repurchase option and the long term lease, if used
openly and notoriously as a subterfuge to carry out racial residential
segregation, could be made unenforceable by separating the form from
the substance and revealing the real motive behind their use.
43
Regardless of the efficacy of the legal devices, one may expect an
increase in extra-legal programs dedicated to the maintenance of
racially segregated residential areas. Through social 4 4 economic45 and
and constitutes an encumbrance entitling the purchaser who was to receive a
merchantable title to refuse to take title. Genske v. Jensen, 188 Wis. 17, 205
N. W. 548 (1925). See Note, 51 A. L. R. 1460 (1927).
" U. S. News & World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 23, col. 1.
40 Courts have held that a condition permitting alienation to anyone but a
member of the testator's family is void. 2 SiMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS §459 (1936).
41 Cf. 2 Sn&as, FUTURE INTEREsTS §459 (p. 301) (1936) (suggesting in favor
of a restraint against alienation to Negroes that "considering human prejudices
as they are, it often renders a piece of land more readily alienable rather than
less so.").
4" The trend of whites moving from the older areas into the new residential
subdivisions continues. During the past few years the racial restrictive agreement
is reported to have accompanied the development of many of the new low-cost
housing projects. See Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News, May 4, 1948, p. 1, col. 4;
N. Y. Times, May 4, 1948, p. 2, col. ? (over 75% of the new developments are
"covered"). The Negroes are moving into the former "white" neighborhoods.
Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News. Ibid.
"46 MICH. L. REv. 978, 979 (1948).
""Social forces" as used here expresses the accumulation of attitudes, fears,
prejudices, customs and traditions, and the searches for better living conditions.
A "snobbish" and "cool" attitude toward undesirable neighbors is a part of the
pattern. Popular Government, June 1948, p. 11, col. 2 (Institute of Govt., Chapel
Hill, N. C.). The "aversion" toward Negroes' living in close proximity with
whites is another factor. MANGUM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 138 (1940). See
STERNER, note 9 supra. As McGovney, supra note 2, at 21 put another problem,
"The question is ... purchase by a Negro from a c'illing seller ... or occupancy
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harassing4 forces the sale of property in white neighborhoods to
Negroes will be retarded but not completely blocked. Such restraints
will gradually yield.47
by a Negro who has bought from a willing seller." In the "better" residential
areas the "willing seller" is difficult to find. In the South there is a tacit under-
standing that such a thing "just isn't done." MANGUM, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 147; STERNER, op. cit. supra, note 7, at 208; Wyatt v. Adair, 215 Ala. 363, 110
So. 801 (1926) (the custom recognized). See Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News,
supra note 18 ("In the first place property owners hardly would sell to Ne-
groes . . ."). The attitudes of the Negro must be considered. STERNER, op. Cit.
supra note 7, at 201 reports that many Negroes may prefer to live in the Negro
areas, even if they do not like to be forced to do so. See note 49, infra. No case
found in North Carolina where a Negro has attempted to buy property from a
white man, where property was covered by a restrictive covenant. See Brief for
the Appellants, p. 3, Vernon v. R. J. Reynolds Realty Co., 226 N. C. 58, 36 S. E.
2d 710 (1945) ("Numerous negroes are desirous of purchasing lots in the develop-
ment, but none will buy or offer to buy any lot until the restriction is annulled."
[Emphasis supplied.] Suit to remove restrictive covenant against Negroes as cloud
on title). Query: will the inclusion of these agreements in deeds continue to have
the same effect?
'" Private lending institutions and real estate agents or associations, interested
in preserving property values (see note 8 supra) exert pressure in ". . . blocking
areas of expansion for additional housing for Negroes and other minorities . . ."
playing a role that is ". . . finely drawn and enacted at a level of sophistication
and professional respectability. It is a role which frequently is not discharged
with race as a controlling, central objective . . ." but nevertheless a ".... significant
and determining role ... ." LONG AND JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 13, at 56-72;
STERNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 209; Popular Government, June, 1948, p. 11, col.
2; U. S. News & World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 23, col. 2. The ". . . traditional
real estate and financial practice of restricting Negroes and other racial minorities
to sharply defined neighborhoods . . ." was recognized in a statement by Raymond
M. Foley, Administrator of the Housing and Home Finance Agency, appearing
in PREJUDICE AND PROPERTY, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 24. The housing policies
of the Federal Government lent support to the residential segregation of Negroes.
One of the recommended restrictions in the FHA Underwriting Manual (1938)
par. 980 g. reads: "Prohibition of the occupancy of properties except by race for
which they are intended." LONG AND JOHNsON, op. cit. supra note 13, at 69;
STERNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 310-323. Recent reports that the FHA is con-
sidering a regulation refusing insurance on loans made by private institutions
where the conveyance to the property contains a racial restrictive agreement, U. S.
News & World Report, May 14, 1948, p. 50, col. 3, have been confirmed but no
definite action has been taken. The suggestions of FHA on this would carry great
weight. FHA, Seventh Annual Report, p. 22 (Dec. 31, 1940).
.... violence and intimidation play a large role in keeping Negroes out of
white-dominated areas .... Bombings, racial propaganda, and mob violence have
been widely, if sporadically reported." STERNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 209
(1943). "From July 1, 1917, to July 27, 1919, there were 24 arson-bombings
perpetrated against Negro homes in Chicago, while from May 1, 1944, to July 20,
1946, there were 46 such acts of violence." LONG AND JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note
13, at 73. On "Racial Tensions and Violence" in general, see id. at 73-85; MAN-
GUM, op. cit. supra note 3, at 274-307; MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DrLEMMA 558-569
(1944). "I just want to say that the Supreme Court decision of yesterday
[Racial Restrictive Agreement Cases, supra note 1] did more to bring about a
revival of the Ku Klux Klan in the United States than anything else that has
been done in the last 40 years." John Bell Williams, Congressman from Missis-
sippi, 94 Cong. Rec. 5389 (May 4, 1948). In addition to these acts and threats
of violence, harassment by police and other local authorities may be employed to
maintain residential segregation. U. S. News & World Report, May 14, 1948,
p. 23, col. 3. For a combination of these types of "applied force" read the story
of the Sojourner Truth Housing Riots in Detroit during the spring of 1942.
MYRDAL, op. cit. supra, at 568, 678, 1337 (1944) ; Life, March 16, 1942, pp. 40-41.
"' No segregation can be complete. With increased professionalizing of law
1949]
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It is obvious that the Court's rulings will not eliminate either the
attempts to continue racial residential segregation or the sociological
problems thereby created. 48  Nor will they cause any mass movement
of Negroes into the white neighborhoods.49  Although the legal title
to property now covered by a racial restrictive agreement is not affected,
the marketable title has probably depreciated in value where invasion
by Negroes is imminent.50 For constitutional law purposes the decisions
are the most important of the year in terms of legal theory ;51 for the
Negro they remove another legal obstacle in his effort to secure the full
benefits of his American citizenship. 52
The Racial Restrictive Agreement Cases53 must be accepted for
what they are: policy-making decisions by the Court, though one may
question the making of national policy as a function of the Supreme
enforcement agencies the harrassing methods will become less effective. REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON Crvi, RIGHTS 155 (1947). Economic inter-
ests will overcome personal prejudices when offers from Negroes to white prop-
erty owners are too tempting. STERNER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 209. And "social
pressures" with their prejudices will gradually give way in the recognition of the
Negro's position as an American citizen. ". . . the broad social problem . . . is
both serious and acute . . . its right solution in the general public interest calls
for the best in statesmanship and the highest in patriotism .... But . . . up to
the present no law or public policy has been contrived or declared whereby to
eradicate social or racial distinctions in the private affairs of individuals. And it
should now be apparent that if ever the two races are to meet upon mutually
satisfactory ground, it cannot be through legal coercion or through intimidation
of factions, or the violence of partisans, but must be the result of a mutual
appreciation of each other's problems, and a voluntary consent of individuals.
And it is to this end that the wisest and best of each race should set their course."
Chief Justice Groner in Mays v. Burgess, 147 F. 2d 869, 873 (App. D. C. 1945).
,' The correlation between poor housing on one hand and crime, disease and
social unrest on the other hand has been demonstrated so often by experts that no
emphasis is needed here. E.g., Justice Edgerton dissenting in Hurd v. Ho.dge,
162 F. 2d at 244 (App. D. C. 1947), reversed, 68 Sup. Ct. 847 (1948) ; PREJUDICE
AND PROPERTY, op. cit. supra note 3, at 12-17, especially at 14; STERNER, op. cit.
supra note 7, at 202; Kahen, supra note 3; MYRDAL, op. cit. supra note 46, at 376,
379, 623, 625, 1290 n. 36 (1944).
' The current housing shortage with its low vacancy rates, the very forces
creating residential segregation, in addition to the income, social and cultural
status identifications are factors that will prevent any mass movement. STERNER,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 201 n. 13 (1943) ; LONG AND JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note
13, at 106; "Little Effect Here," Greensboro (N. C.) Daily News, May 4, 1948,
p. 1, col. 4. See notes 8 and 9 supra.
o See note 8 supra.
Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-1948, 16 U. oF Cal. L. REv.
1, 22-23 (1948) ; see note 3 supra (state action).
" E.g., Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946) (elimination of segregation
in interstate transportation) ; Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942) (Negroes'
right to serve on juries) ; Alston v. School Board, 112 F. 2d 992 (C. C. A. 4th
1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 693 (1940) (same pay for same work in public
schools); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917) (residential segregation by
state ordinance prohibited) ; Sipuel v. Board of Regents of Oklahoma, 68 Sup.
Ct. 299 (1948) (more stringent application of the "separate but equal" doctrine
in public schools); 46 MicH. L. REv. 639, 644 (1948) ; HENRY LED MOON, BAL.,
ANCE OF POWER-THE NEGRO VOTE 215-219 (1948).3 68 Sup. Ct. 836, 847 (1948).
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Court of the United States.54  The Court has taken a step down the
road to social progress that no state court,55 only one federal court,56
no state legislature,57 and not even the Congress of the United States58
has attempted. One may praise 9 or condemn 0 the Court for its bold-
ness. Either view, however, must be reconciled with two hard facts:
(1) judicial pronouncements will not alone eliminate prejudices against
minority groups-only through the process of education 6' is that pos-
"' E.g., Chief Justice Walter Clark, of the North Carolina Supreme Court,
strongly argued that "policy" was the question to be determined by the people
through their representative assemblies and not by the courts. BROOKS, WALTER
CLARK-FIGHTING JUDGE 192-205 ("Government by Judges") (1944). It is inter-
esting to note that the dedication of this book reads: "To the Supreme Court of
the United States which now reflects the views of Walter Clark." Today the
Court appears- to be most vitally concerned with at least one element of "public
welfare"-that of civil rights-and it has accepted the task of interpreting the
Constitution most favorably toward minority groups. Perhaps it is the "role"
of the Court to formulate policy, especially when no other agency of government
will undertake the challenge. See "The Role of the Supreme Court as a Guardian
of Civil Rights" REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoM mITEE ON CiviL RIGHTS 112(1947). Cf. Speech of Congressman John E. Rankin, of Mississippi, "Protecting
the American People from the Supreme Court." 94 Cong. Rec. 5388 (May 4,
1948) (after the decisions in principal cases).
"5 See note 14 supra. As evidence of a public policy in favor of racial resi-
dential segregation see note 5 supra.
" Gandofolo v. Hartman, 49 Fed. 181 (C. C. Calif. 1892) is the only federal
case to hold otherwise prior to these decisions.
"" No state statutes have been found prohibiting the use of racial restrictive
agreements in connection with the ownership or occupancy of real property. Recent
attempts to have such agreements outlawed have failed in Illinois and Minnesota,
LONG AND JOHNSON, op. cit. supra note 13, at 99-100; and in New York, Taylor,
supra note 3, at 98.
"' The Congress is silent, or at least, was silent until the principal decisions.
On May 4, 1948, two Congressmen from Mississippi (Rankin and Williams) stated
their opinions on the Racial Restrictive Agreement Cases. 94 Cong. Rec. 5388(May 4, 1948). Other references were made. Id. p. 5403, col. 2 (by Mr. Mar-
cantonio of N. Y.) ; p. 5404, col. 1 (by Mr. Walter of Pa.); p. 5405, col. 2 (by
Mr. Devitt of Minn.).
" "The Supreme Court has handed down a momentous decision.... I think
we have taken a big step forward in assuring democratic rights in this country."
Eleanor Roosevelt, My Day, News and Observer (Raleigh, N. C.), May 6, 1948,
p. 4, col. 3. The decisions were "acclaimed" by leaders of Negro and Jewish
groups. N. Y. Times, May 4, 1948, p. 2, col. 2. See note 3 supra.
" In a one minute speech before the House of Representatives on May 4, 1948,
on the topic, "Protecting the American People from the Supreme Court," Mr. John
E. Rankin, Congressman from Mississippi said: "Mr. Speaker, there must have
been a celebration in Moscow last night; for the Communists won their greatest
victory in the Supreme Court of the United States on yesterday, when that once
august body proceeded to destroy the value of property owned by tens of thousands
of loyal Americans in every State in the Union by their anti-covenants decision...
[after referring to other acts of "destruction" by the Court]. . . . They now
attempt to reverse the laws of nature by their own edict and destroy the peaceful
relationships existing between different races in every State by outlawing the
restrictive covenants that have existed for more than 100 years. [Cf. with note
13 supra.] Which all adds up to the fact that white Christian Americans seem
to have no rights left which the present Supreme Court feels bound to respect....
Unless the Congress . . . turns back this tide of fanaticism then God save the
country," 94 Cong. Rec. 5388 (May 4, 1948). See Editorial, A Blow to Southern
Customs, Charlotte (N. C.) News, May 5, 1948, p. 4-A, col. 1.
"l The decisions in the principal cases ".... may be a contribution to the educa-
tional process by which the Emancipation Proclamation may in some distant era
become a reality." Frank, supra note 51, at 26.
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sible; and (2) these prejudices with their fearful effects on our society
must be supplanted by an understanding tolerance.0 2
0. MAX GARDNER, JR.
Constitutional Law-Statutory Construction-Judicial
Determination of End of War
Last June, in Ludecke v. Watkins,1 the United States Supreme
Court interpreted the Alien Enemy Act.2 In 1946 the Attorney Gen-
"2"A minority [including Dr. Frank P. Graham, President of the University
of North Carolina] of the Committee favors the elimination of segregation as an
ultimate goal but . . . opposes the imposition of a federal sanction. It believes
that federal aid to states for education, health, research and other public benefits
should be granted provided that the states do not discriminate in the distribution
of the funds. It dissents, however, from the majority's recommendation that the
abolition of segregation be made a requirement, until the people of the states in-
volved have themselves abolished the provisions in their state constitutions and
laws which now require segregation. Some members are against the non-segrega-
tion requirement in educational grants on the ground that it represents federal
control over education. They feel, moreover, that the best way to ultimately end
segregation is to raise the educational level of the people in the states affected; and
to inculcate both the teachings of religion regarding human brotherhood and the
ideals of our democracy regarding freedom and equality as a more solid basis for
genuine and lasting acceptance by the peoples of the states." THE REPORT OF THE
PRESMnENT'S CoMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTs 166-167 (Washington, 1947). "While
it is recognized that all barriers against the race cannot be eradicated overnight
by executive fiat, court decree, or legislative action, the Negro people of America
believe that it is the obligation of the government, of the labor movement, and of
all true progressives to take a clear, consistent, and unequivocal line against racial
discrimination and segregation. They believe that the objective of national policy
should be full equality for all citizens. And they have been encouraged in this
conviction by the report of the President's Committee on Civil Rights." HENRY
LEE MooN ("The Ultimate Objective"), BALANCE OF POwER-THE NEGRO VOTE,
p. 218 (1948).
One can only begin to grasp the scope of the issue raised by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the Racial Restrictive Agreement Cases when these two
statements are compared with excerpts from a speech made by Governor J. Strom
Thurmond (S. C.) at the Dixiecrat Convention in Jackson, Miss., during the
month of May, 1948: "All the laws of Washington and the bayonets of the Army
cannot force the Negro into their (Southern) homes, their schools, their churches
and their places of recreation and amusement." Quoted in Editorial, Charlotte(N. C.) News, May 11, 1948, p. 4-A, col. 1; or with the following statement
from DAVID L. COHN, WH RE I WAS BORN AND RAISED 294 (1948): "Since the
deep-seated mores of a people cannot be changed by law, and since segregation is
the most deep-seated and pervasive of the Southern white mores, it is evident
that he who attempts to abolish it by law runs risks of incalculable gravity. There
are nonetheless whites and Negroes who would break down segregation by Fed-
eral fiat. Let them beware. I have little doubt that in such a case the country
would find itself nearing civil war." And further, at page 294: "Yet whatever
may be the disabilities worked upon Negroes and whites by segregation; whether
the fears that provoke it are reasonable or unreasonable; whether it is anti-
democratic, anti-constitutional or anti-Christian, there is little chance, in my
opinion, that it will be obliterated in a foreseeable time. He who evades, beclouds,
or challenges the issue may do great harm to the whole American society."
'68 Sup. Ct. 1429 (1948).2REV. STAT. §40617 (1875), 40 STAT. 531 (1918), 50 U. S. C. §21 (1946)("Whenever there is a declared war between the United States and any foreign
nation or government, or any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, at-
tempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign
[Vol. 27
